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INTELLIGENCE AND PARALLEL VERSUS SEQUENTIAL 
ORGANIZATION OF INFORMATION PROCESSING IN ANALOGICAL 
REASONING
The construct of the organization of information processing (OIP) has been adopted as a possible cog-
nitive mechanism responsible for human intelligent functioning. Participants (N = 77) were asked to 
solve an analogical reasoning task, a test of divided attention, a working memory capacity test, and 
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices as a standard test of general fl uid intelligence. On the basis of 
the chronometric analysis of their performance in the analogy task, participants were divided into those 
preferring to use parallel or sequential modes of organization of information processing. It appeared 
that intelligent people using the parallel mode of processing obtained the best results in the analogical 
reasoning test. Other subgroups did not differ substantially from one another. It also appeared that intel-
ligent people using the parallel mode of processing performed equally well regardless of their attentional 
resources and working memory capacity, whereas people using the sequential mode of processing were 
much more dependent on these basic cognitive limitations. A compensatory mechanism is suggested in 
order to account for this data: the parallel mode of processing probably helps to compensate for defi cient 
attention or impaired working memory, whereas the sequential mode cannot act in a compensatory way.
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This paper explores the role of parallel versus 
sequential information processing in dealing with 
analogical problem solving tasks by more and 
less intelligent persons. Compound interactions 
between parallel versus sequential processing, 
cognitive resources of attention and working 
memory, and fl uid intelligence will be examined 
in order to establish the conditions in which 
an individual is best predisposed to deal with 
analogy tasks. We will attempt to demonstrate 
that parallel (rather than sequential) processing 
makes a person less vulnerable to the detrimental 
consequences of ineffective attention or impaired 
working memory, provided that high levels 
of psychometric intelligence are nonetheless 
observed. The data allows for speculation about 
possible sources and mechanisms of individual 
differences in effi ciency of analogical reasoning.
Intelligence is frequently defi ned as an 
ability to solve complex problems (Sternberg 
& Detterman, 1986). According to Carlstedt, 
Gustafsson and Ullstadius (2000), who comment 
on the results of the survey conducted by Linda 
Gottfredson (1997), two aspects of human 
intelligence appear essential: quick adaptation to 
new situations and effi cient solution of complex 
cognitive tasks. Hence, in order to assess who 
is intelligent, it is necessary to work out the 
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criteria based on either novelty or complexity. 
In practice, the complexity criterion is more 
frequently applied (at least in measurement) due 
to the fact that novel tasks and situations are 
diffi cult to arrange in controlled conditions of 
psychological assessment. Intelligence tests are 
thus typically constructed as sets of tasks that 
require solution of a series of complex problems, 
usually inductive reasoning problems such as 
analogy, series completion, and classifi cations 
(Lohman, 2000; Sternberg, 1985).
Although complex cognitive tasks are widely 
used in the assessment of intelligence, they are 
less popular in psychological investigations of 
the cognitive processes underlying intelligent 
performance (Nęcka & Orzechowski, 2005; 
Orzechowski, 2010). Sternberg’s (1977a, 
1977b, 1985) infl uential work on componential 
analysis is a widely cited but not quite often 
pursued example of how analogical reasoning 
tasks may be used in order to decompose the 
cognitive processes responsible for intelligence. 
Other important examples are investigations of 
the process of solving certain intelligence tests 
(Hunt, 1974). For instance, Carpenter, Just, and 
Shell (1990) found two sources of individual 
differences in performance on Raven’s test: the 
ability to infer multiple relations between objects 
and the ability to divide complex test items 
into simpler subgoals. This kind of approach is 
generally not very popular among researchers, 
probably due to the fact that complex problem 
solving does not allow for straightforward 
insight into the very core of human intelligent 
functioning. Even though intelligence manifests 
itself in complex problem solving, it is not 
easily observable through such tasks. Efforts to 
understand intelligence in this manner resemble 
making inferences about the construction and 
mechanisms of a toasting machine only on the 
basis of a piece of toast’s taste. There is of course 
a connection between taste and the functioning of 
the machine, but taste can tell us little about the 
mechanisms underlying the process of toasting.
Therefore, an alternative approach, consisting 
of the study of elementary cognitive processes 
which underlie intelligence, has been adopted 
(Deary, 2000). Studies on reaction time (Jensen, 
1982, 1987), inspection time (Deary, 1993; 
Nettelbeck, 1987), attention (Nęcka, 1996; 
Schweizer, 2010; Stankov, 1983; Sullivan & 
Stankov, 1990), and working memory (Chuderski 
and Nęcka, 2011; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; 
Nęcka, 1992) brought about an abundance 
of data concerning the relationships between 
psychometric intelligence and elementary 
cognitive tasks (ECTs). These data are usually 
interpreted in terms of the bottom-up explanation 
of intelligence: since ECTs are simple enough 
to be tackled with no demands on intelligence, 
their connections with IQ suggest that there exist 
certain basic information processing foundations 
for higher mental capacities. While adopting 
the top-down approach, it is always tempting 
to say that some people do better with complex 
tasks because they are intelligent, whereas the 
bottom-up approach suggests that some people 
are intelligent because they are fast or accurate in 
various ECTs. Assuming that the more elementary 
functions determine more complex ones, the 
bottom-up approach allows for speculation 
regarding the nature of intelligence instead of 
treating it as an explanatory factor.
In this paper, we employ a mode of studying 
human intelligence that needs both top-
down and bottom-up approaches (Nęcka & 
Orzechowski, 2005; Orzechowski, 2010). We 
focus on analogical reasoning as one of the 
prototypical intellectual processes which take 
place in numerous test-like and real-life tasks. 
It is widely accepted that analogy and relational 
reasoning must be treated as two of the most 
important constituents of human intelligence 
(Holyoak, 2005). However, we do not aim at 
the Sternberg-like decomposition of successive 
stages of analogy solution (Sternberg, 1977a, 
1977b). We intend to use the analogy tasks 
as a means to activate the human information 
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processing apparatus and to inspect whether it 
works in the parallel or sequential mode. For that 
goal, we suggest to use the term “organization 
of information processing” (OIP), introduced 
by Orzechowski (1998, 2004) in his non-
linear parallel model of analogical reasoning. 
OIP refers to the individually differentiated 
modes of information processing, related to the 
sequential-parallel dimension. In the case of 
sequential OIP, each component of the cognitive 
process is initiated only after termination of the 
previous one. In the case of parallel processing, 
consecutive components are “switched on” as 
early as possible, usually before the termination 
of previous process (see: Logan, 2002; Van Zandt 
& Townsend, 1993). Pure sequential and parallel 
modes of processing are assumed to constitute 
opposite poles of the continuous dimension of 
OIP. Real mental processes locate themselves 
somewhere in the middle of this dimension 
(McClelland, 1979).
According to the model, modes of OIP differ 
in speed of processing as well as in the demands 
they put on the cognitive system. Parallel OIP 
reduces the time needed to complete a task 
because consecutive stages overlap in time, thus 
cutting down the overall response latency. Due to 
the necessity to control two or more components 
simultaneously, this kind of OIP calls for the 
investment of more attentional resources. Storage 
capacity of working memory (WMC), on the 
other hand, is less exploited in parallel processing 
since all necessary information is easily available 
in perception.  On the other hand, in the case of 
sequential OIP  mental tasks are completed slower 
because there is no time reduction due to partial 
overlap of consecutive stages of processing. As 
to mental resources demands, the sequential OIP 
needs more storage capacity but less attentional 
resources. Sequential processing is not possible 
without keeping information about the previous 
stage in the WM. However, attentional resources 
are not substantially exhausted due to the fact 
that the pieces of task information are dispersed 
among successive stages of processing. Thus, 
parallel OIP should need a greater amount of 
attentional resources and less WMC, whereas 
sequential OIP should require the opposite (i.e. 
capacious WM rather than large amount of 
attentional resources). In other words, parallel 
OIP is more demanding for attention than for 
WM, whereas sequential OIP is more demanding 
for WM than for attention.
The relationships between mental resources 
and OIP are assumed to be mutual. Certain 
modes of OIP require more attention and less 
storage capacity, or vice versa. For instance, a 
person using the sequential mode of processing 
must clean out their storage capacity of WM 
from unnecessary or unwanted chunks of 
information, whereas a person who wishes to 
process information in the parallel mode should 
mobilize their attentional mechanisms and shed 
the surplus of information that usually resides in 
its focus. By doing so, cognitive resources can 
be prepared to meet requirements set by certain 
modes of OIP. However, sequential or parallel 
OIP can also be switched on or off in order to 
compensate for scarcity of mental resources. 
Attention and working memory are limited in 
their capacity to deal with complex situations. If 
capacities are at the highest possible level and 
thus cannot be further mobilized, there may be 
an opportunity to change the OIP in order to 
release some amount of mental resources. In this 
way, mental resources may be mobilized in order 
to enable the preferred mode of OIP, whereas 
certain modes of OIP may compensate for the 
insuffi cient amount of mental resources.
Taking into account the above-mentioned 
theoretical premises, we hypothesize that 
psychometric intelligence should interact with 
the organization of information processing in 
determining the level of performance on an 
analogical reasoning task. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis formulated by Raz, Willerman, and 
Yama (1987), according to which effi ciency in 
parallel processing tasks should correlate with IQ 
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while in serial processing tasks such a correlation 
should not occur. We predict that high intelligence 
individuals are generally more accurate than 
those with low intelligence, particularly so if 
they prefer the parallel mode of processing. In 
other words, being an intelligent person with 
preferences for the parallel mode of cognitive 
processing should result in the best indices of 
performance on analogy tasks. Although high 
intelligence individuals can “afford” parallel OIP 
thanks to their effi cient attention (Dempster & 
Corkill, 1999; Hunt & Lansman, 1982; Nęcka, 
1996; Schweizer & Moosbrugger, 2003) and 
sequential OIP thanks to their capacious working 
memory (Ackerman, Beier, and Boyle, 2005; 
Chuderski, Taraday, Necka, & Smoleń, 2012; 
Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & 
Minkoff, 2002; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; 
Miller & Vernon, 1992; Nęcka, 1992; Süß, 
Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 
2002), we assume that they prefer the more 
profi table parallel mode. Of course, they do not 
have to prefer this mode of processing, in which 
case they should obtain slightly worse indices of 
performance compared to their “parallel” peers. 
It should be so because the sequential mode of 
processing, if preferred, makes a person more 
prone to errors in the analogy tasks. Sequential 
OIP is more demanding in terms of temporary 
storage capacity, thus increasing the probability 
of error. Low intelligence individuals would 
likely be characterized by large number of errors, 
regardless of their preferred OIP. 
METHOD
Participants
Seventy-seven high school students, 38 male 
and 39 female, took part in this experiment. 
Their average age was 17.6 years (SD = 0.6). 
Each participant was paid a small amount of 
money at the end of the experimental procedure. 
Participation in this research was voluntary. 
However, as participants were juvenile, we 
additionally asked for parental consent.
Analogical Reasoning Task (ART)
The task consisted of 30 non-verbal analogies, 
created according to the scheme A:B::C:D 
(Orzechowski, 1998). In every trial, a computer 
generated a set of geometrical fi gures and the 
rule of their transformation. Part B of every 
analogy task was constructed as a transformation 
of part A, according to one of the three rules of 
alteration: by 180-degree rotation, by mirror 
vertical refl ection, and by mirror horizontal 
refl ection. Part C was generated independently of 
parts A and B, and part D had to be chosen from 
among three alternatives located at the bottom of 
the screen (see Figure 1). Participants were asked 
to choose the correct answer, on the condition 
that the relation C:D is similar to the relation A:
B. The algorithm of analogy generation ensured 
a low probability of identical sets of stimuli to 
appear in any pair of consecutive trials, while the 
principle of comparable levels of complexity of 
all trials was applied. The instructions and fi ve 
practice trials preceded the task proper.
There were three experimental conditions, 10 
trials per condition. The task was divided into two 
parts: single (fi rst condition) and dual (second and 
third conditions). In the single condition, appear-
ance of each part of the task required pressing a 
Figure 1. Analogical Reasoning Test (ART): an exem-
plary item.
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computer key (down arrow). Thus, participants 
could control the presentation time of consecutive 
task elements (A, B, C while the experimenters 
were able to measure the exploration time of each 
part of the analogy task, as well as the overall de-
cision-making time (A, B, C, D).
In the second and third conditions, a dual 
task paradigm was employed. Simultaneously 
with the analogical reasoning task, participants 
had to execute a simple psychomotor task: they 
were required to keep a constantly moving line in 
one position on the computer screen. They were 
instructed that the analogy task was the priority, 
with the level of secondary task execution being an 
index of the participants’ attentional engagement 
in the primary task. The more resources left over 
while processing the priority task, the better 
performance on the secondary task should be. 
The second condition was termed “voluntary”, 
as each person was free to choose the tempo of 
switching on consecutive parts of the task. As a 
result, the participant was also free to choose the 
preferred OIP and cognitive strategy.
In the third condition, participants also 
controlled the screening of consecutive parts of 
the analogy task but presentation of each part 
automatically removed the previous one from 
the screen. For example, appearance of part B of 
the analogy task caused that part A disappeared 
from the screen. So, in the third condition, only 
one part of the task was visible. This condition 
was therefore labeled “forced”. In contrast to 
the previously described “voluntary” condition, 
this one called for analytical and sequential 
processing of information as successive parts 
of the analogy task had to be processed one by 
one in order to assure the appropriate amount 
of information needed for proceeding stages of 
processing. In cases of insuffi cient, careless, or 
superfi cial processing, an error could appear 
simply because additional exploration of previous 
parts of the analogy was impossible. In other 
words, the analysis of incoming material had to 
occur immediately and with suffi cient accuracy.
The difference in reaction times (RT) 
between “forced” and “voluntary” conditions 
served as an index of the OIP mode during the 
analogical reasoning process. We assumed that 
people having higher effi ciency in, or preference 
for, the parallel mode of processing would lose 
more if forced to process information in a serial 
manner connected to the sequential OIP. In other 
words, the RT difference between “forced” 
and “voluntary” conditions should be greater 
for subjects preferring parallel processing. 
Conversely, the loss caused by sequential 
processing enforcement should be quite small 
for sequential OIP participants because the task 
requirements would be compatible with their 
natural preferences, thus resulting in increased 
effi ciency of task performance. Our sample of 
participants was dichotomized according to the 
median point of the OIP distribution so that 
further analyses could be performed within the 
ANOVA model.
RT was measured during the entire ART task 
(3 conditions x 4 parts of analogy = 12 measures), 
together with the number of errors in analogies (3 
measures) and number of errors in the secondary 
task for dual task conditions (2 conditions x 4 
parts = 8 measures). Average time needed to 
complete this task was 30 minutes.
Divided Attention Test (DiVA)
This procedure, developed by Nęcka and 
colleagues (Nęcka, 1996; see also: Nęcka, 
2000), is an integrated attention test enabling 
the measurement of effi ciency of selective and 
divided attention. Its development was based on 
the dual task paradigm (Kahneman, 1973). Stimuli 
were letters appearing within two boxes on the 
computer screen. In the central box, a capital 
letter was presented as a target. Participants had 
to respond with the left mouse key every time a 
small letter, identical in meaning with the target, 
appeared on the screen. The target changed after 
each 20 seconds, and during this time four signals 
(i.e., small relevant letters) appeared. There 
Authenticated | 195.187.97.1
Download Date | 12/12/12 2:02 PM
46 Jarosław Orzechowski, Edward Nęcka
Studia Psychologiczne, t. 49 (2011), z. 5, s. 41–54
were three to fi ve probe letters on the screen at 
the same time. They appeared randomly within 
the biggest box (14 x 18 cm.). The letters were 
presented in a constant tempo: every second, one 
letter disappeared and a new one appeared on 
the screen. In half of the conditions, a distractor 
appeared on the screen in the form of a capital 
letter physically identical to the target. Subjects 
had to respond only to small letters corresponding 
to the target, so all the irrelevant small letters, as 
well as distractors, had to be ignored. 
In the second part of the test, a simple 
psychomotor task was introduced. This task had 
to be performed together with the selection of 
letters and required participants to control the 
position of a line moving within the rectangle 
placed near the left or right end of the computer 
screen. The line was constantly descending 
and every few seconds changed its place from 
the left to the right side, or vice versa. Pressing 
the right mouse key made the line move up. If 
the line moved beyond the rectangle (i.e., too 
low or too high), the computer generated a 440 
MHz sound which stopped when the participant 
corrected the position of the line. Thus, not 
pressing the key caused the line drop down, 
while pressing it constantly moved it too high; 
both cases evoked an unpleasant sound. These 
operations were introduced in order to make it 
diffi cult for participants to ignore the secondary 
task altogether, or to automatize it too quickly.
According to the dual task paradigm, the 
decrease of effi ciency in a selection task between 
dual and single conditions should be lower for 
people with an effi cient resource allocation 
mechanism. This advantage should reveal itself 
in shorter RTs and a lower number of errors. 
Participants were instructed that both tasks were 
equally important. Both parts, single and dual, 
were preceded with practice trials.
Horizon task
This task was developed by Nęcka and 
colleagues (Nęcka, 2000) as an assessment tool 
for the effi ciency of working memory. It requires 
participants to remember complex non-verbal 
stimuli: fi gures built of 8 squares, of which 4 
were always fi lled and 4 were empty. Altogether, 
56 different fi gures of that type were used, all of 
similar diffi culty concerning visual encoding. 
Each fi gure appeared twice in the course of 
the whole task, in precisely defi ned intervals. 
The Horizon task consisted of 8 experimental 
conditions in which the interval between the fi rst 
and the second appearance of each stimulus was 
manipulated. These two presentations could be 
interspersed by one to eight other fi gures. Seven 
trials were introduced for each condition, totaling 
112 trials altogether (8 conditions x 7 trials x 2 
presentations of each stimulus). Conditions were 
randomized and blocked in a script of trials, 
identical for each participant. After starting the 
program, all 56 fi gures were randomly attributed 
to 56 slots in the script. Thus, the rigid sequence 
of presentations was fi lled with different content 
each time. The task was to decide whether the 
fi gure presented on screen had already been 
shown. The YES, NO or DON’T KNOW 
decisions were connected to the right, left, or 
up arrow on a computer keyboard respectively. 
After each press, another fi gure appeared. The 
total amount of correct answers was used as an 
index of working memory capacity. Total time 
necessary to complete the Horizon task ranged 
between 15 to 20 minutes.
Psychometric tool
We used Raven’s Advanced Progressive 
Matrices (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1983) as 
an intelligence test apt to providing a good 




The average RT in the basic ART condition 
(single task condition) was 28.6 sec. (SD = 11.5 
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sec.), whereas in the double task condition it was 
25.6 sec. (SD = 11.7 sec). These conditions did 
not differ signifi cantly concerning RT, which 
corroborates the effectiveness of the instruction 
to treat the analogy task as a priority in the 
double task condition. RT of correct answers 
was shorter than reaction times of incorrect 
answers, regardless of the condition (F(1,59) = 
31.70; p < 0.0001). As to accuracy, the ART task 
appeared quite diffi cult for the participants, since 
they committed 9.4 errors on average in 30 trials 
(SD = 3.8). The third condition (“forced”) was 
the most diffi cult: in 10 tasks 4.75 errors were 
committed (SD = 1.6). No signifi cant difference 
was found between “basic” and “voluntary” 
conditions concerning the number of errors. Basic 
statistics for the analogy task performance in all 
three conditions are presented in Table 1. Basic 
statistics for remaining measures are presented in 
Table 2. 
Experimental manipulation with the 
“voluntary” versus “forced” conditions led to 
different time courses of solving the analogy 
task (F(6, 450) = 131,49; p = 0,0001; see Figure 
2). In the “voluntary” condition, RTs were 
similar to the single task condition: participants 
analyzed the fi rst three parts of an analogy for 
about 2 seconds, and then took approximately 20 
seconds to correctly choose part D. Comparison 
of overall RTs showed no signifi cant differences 
between all three conditions. However, in the 
third condition (“forced”) the number of errors 
Table 2. Basic statistics for indices of organization of information processing (OIP), amount of attentional reso-
urces (AR), capacity of working memory (WMC), and general fl uid intelligence (Gf).
Index    mean   SD   median  
OIP (sec.)   1.85   12.15   1.08
AR (error rate)   10.39   6.76   9.00
WMC (error rate)   47.45   10.37   47.5
Gf (RAPM score)  22.42   5.68   23.00
Table 1 Chronometric and accuracy measures of performance on the analogical reasoning task (ART)
Condition Basic    Voluntary   Forced
  RT SD   RT SD   RT SD 
Stage A  1.85 1.00   1.80 0.89   8.70 3.62
Stage B  2.01 2.33   1.92 2.82   6.53 4.93
Stage C  2.25 2.54   1.62 2.13   7.29 6.17
Stage D  22.96 12.06   20.31 11.57   5.09 2.52
Error rate 2.48    2.22    4.75
Note. RT – reaction time, SD – standard deviation of reaction time, error rate – the average number of errors.
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increased signifi cantly (F(1,76) = 128.90; p < 
0.0001), and the effi ciency of secondary task 
performance dropped substantially (F(1,76) = 
24.74; p < 0.0001).
Differential Effects
Firstly, we checked whether the intelligence 
test results correlated with measures of working 
memory and attention in a pattern compatible 
with the results of previous studies. We found 
that the raw score on Raven’s matrices correlated 
negatively and signifi cantly with the overall 
number of errors committed in the DiVA (r = 
-0.41, p < 0.001) and Horizon (r = -0.30, p < 
0.05) tasks. Although these relationships were 
not particularly strong, they confi rmed our 
expectations that with increasing intelligence 
the results obtained on working memory and 
attention tests improves. We also found that 
intelligence, measured with RAPM, correlated 
negatively with the overall number of errors 
in the ART task (r = -0.47, p < 0.01), thus 
confi rming the increased effi ciency of intelligent 
people in tasks requiring relational thinking and 
fl uid reasoning (Chuderski & Nęcka, submitted; 
Holyoak, 2005).
Secondly, we investigated the relationships 
between the OIP index, defi ned as the RT 
difference between the “forced” and “voluntary” 
conditions, and the analogy task performance 
indices. We found a negative relationship 
between OIP and the overall number of errors in 
the ART task (r = -0.31, p < 0.01). This result 
suggests that people preferring the parallel mode 
of processing showed increased accuracy in the 
analogical reasoning task. Closer examination 
of this relationship revealed that it occurred in 
the “forced” condition only; in the “basic” and 
“voluntary” conditions, respective correlation 
coeffi cients were statistically nonsignifi cant. 
Figure 2. Reaction time of correct responses in three conditions of the ART task. Whiskers represent 95% CI.
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Participants using the parallel mode of OIP 
benefi tted from “forced” sequential mode of task 
presentation, whereas in the case of the holistic 
mode of presentation (“voluntary” condition) 
they did not show any prevalence over their 
“sequential” peers.
Finally, we checked the relationships between 
OIP and Gf so that the main hypothesis of this study 
could be tested. We found that, although OIP did 
not correlate with intelligence level directly, 
it moderated the relationship of intelligence 
to reasoning effi ciency as measured by the 
overall number of errors in the ART task. Low 
intelligence individuals committed signifi cantly 
more errors than those with high intelligence 
regardless of sequential or parallel OIP use. For 
high intelligence individuals, the preferred mode 
of OIP determined relatively lower or higher 
number of errors committed in the ART task. As 
we can see (Figure 3), if the participants with 
high Gf employed parallel OIP, their results in 
the analogical reasoning task were much better 
than in the case of high Gf participants with 
sequential OIP (F(1, 73) = 7.59, p<0.008). Post 
hoc analysis revealed that the high Gf/parallel 
OIP subgroup signifi cantly outperformed other 
subgroups shown in Figure 3 (the difference 
between groups 1 and 4: p < 0.0001, 2 and 4: p < 
0.0001, 3 and 4: p < 0.004). The three remaining 
groups did not differ signifi cantly in ART task 
accuracy.
In order to highlight the importance of OIP 
for the effectiveness of analogical reasoning, we 
performed a series of regression analyses. The 
proportion of variance on ART task accuracy 
explained by the joint infl uence of attentional 
resources and working memory capacity equaled 
28.7% (R2 = 0.2869, F(4, 69) = 6.94, p < 0.0001). 
When Gf (measured with Raven’s matrices) 
entered the regression equation, this proportion 
Figure 3. Average number of errors in the ART task, type of OIP, and IQ level. Whiskers represent 95% CI.
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increased to 41.5% (R2 = 0.4146, F(6, 66) = 7.79, 
p < 0.0001). After adding OIP into the equation, 
the model was able to explain as much as 49.2% 
of variance (R2 = 0.4916, F(8, 64) = 7.73, p < 
0.0001). Thus, we were able to determine that 
the organization of information processing, 
understood as an individually differentiated 
preference for parallel or sequential processing, 
accounted for about 8% of variance of ART task 
accuracy. This contribution was smaller than that 
of attention, working memory, and intelligence, 
but nevertheless it appeared suffi ciently important 
to be taken into account in the theoretical models 
of reasoning.
DISCUSSION
Before entering into the discussion, let us 
recapitulate our fi ndings. We developed a new 
cognitive task that required analogical reasoning. 
This task had three versions, differing in the 
mode of presentation of successive stages of 
each analogy (holistic versus successive) and 
in the cognitive load put on participants (single 
versus dual task conditions). Manipulations with 
reaction time in this task allowed for construction 
of an index of the organization of information 
processing (OIP). The difference in reaction times 
between “forced” and “voluntary” conditions 
served as an index of OIP on the analogical 
reasoning task. We assumed that people who have 
a general preference for parallel OIP would slow 
down if forced to process information in a serial 
manner, whereas their peers with a preference 
for sequential OIP would not. We found that 
psychometric Gf correlated with increased 
accuracy in the cognitive tasks measuring 
attentional resources and working memory 
capacity. Moreover, intelligent individuals were 
more accurate in the analogical reasoning task 
and obtained lower OIP indices, which suggests 
that intelligence tends to co-occur with parallel 
rather than sequential mode of information 
processing. Finally, we found a regression model 
with four independent variables (attentional 
resources, working memory, organization of 
information processing, and intelligence) which 
was able to explain as much as 49.2% of variance 
in accuracy of analogical reasoning. 
It seems, that we indirectly confi rmed the 
hypothesis suggested by Raz, Willerman and 
Yama (1987), according to which effi ciency 
in parallel processing tasks should correlate 
with IQ, while in serial processing tasks such 
a correlation should not occur. This prediction 
has not previously been empirically confi rmed. 
Diascro and Brody (1993) used a visual detection 
task that required detection of diagonal and 
vertical lines (Treisman & Gromican, 1988), 
assuming that detection of diagonal lines works 
in the parallel mode, whereas detection of 
vertical lines needs the sequential mode. Such 
an effect appeared and was confi rmed by the 
fl at RT(N) function, where N represented the 
number of lines in the perceptual fi eld. However, 
Diascro and Brody (1993) did not confi rm their 
differential hypothesis concerning the relationship 
between IQ and detection time of diagonal lines. 
Performance on both serial and parallel processing 
tasks did not depend on IQ. Of course, we used 
different methodology and an entirely new 
operationalization of basic theoretical constructs. 
In our research, we employed complex cognitive 
tasks that enabled us to verify the hypothesis 
using accuracy level. It is worth to underscore 
that the relationships between intelligence and 
OIP were observed when accuracy indices were 
taken into account as dependent variables. There 
is nothing extraordinary in these results: IQ-RT 
correlation in complex cognitive tasks usually 
decreases with task complexity, whereas IQ-
accuracy correlation increases (Wittmann & Süß, 
1999). 
To account for these effects, we call for a 
mechanism of compensation. Limitations of 
attention and working memory are severe and 
commonly observed (see: Nęcka, Orzechowski, 
& Szymura, 2006). Inability to mobilize the 
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required amount of attentional resources, or a 
decreased capacity of working memory, cause 
serious defi ciencies in information processing 
and may result in low performance on important 
cognitive tasks. Complex cognitive tasks seem 
particularly vulnerable from this point of view 
because of the demands they put on the human 
mind. Thus, a question arises whether such 
limitations can be compensated for, and what 
the best compensatory mechanisms are. Our 
research suggests that the parallel organization 
of information processing, as opposed to 
sequential, may serve as a compensatory factor. 
However, this factor seems to work only in the 
case of highly intelligent individuals. Obviously, 
the compensatory mechanism must be limited to 
quite a small percentage of the population because 
it is available only to those who are relatively 
intelligent, whose attention and working memory 
mechanisms are already highly developed. In 
fact, effi cient attention and capacious working 
memory are just correlates of intelligence and 
they are not apt to account for all Gf variance. 
Therefore, there must be individuals whose 
attention or working memory does not work at 
the highest possible level but whose intellectual 
effi cacy is still good enough to locate them within 
the relatively high levels of Gf distribution. The 
compensatory mechanism (as described above) 
is fully available to such people, giving them 
an opportunity to obtain improving measures of 
performance on complex cognitive tasks.
The obtained results may be discussed 
from yet another perspective, namely, from the 
intelligence research point of view. Attention 
and working memory are regarded as the most 
important cognitive prerequisites of general 
intelligence. Working memory capacity seems 
to be particularly important as a strong correlate 
of, or even a substitute for, general mental ability 
(Chuderski & Nęcka, submitted). However, 
research on the cognitive foundations for 
intelligence should not be restricted to attention 
and working memory as cognitive mechanisms 
highly limited in their effi ciency. It seems that 
other aspects of cognition, those not involved 
directly in limitations and effi ciency but rather 
pertaining to preferences, should also be 
considered. We propose that the organization 
of information processing is a good candidate 
for being a cognitive substrate of intelligence, 
and this stance is supported by the fact that OIP 
signifi cantly increased the amount of explained 
variance when added into our regression equation. 
The construct of OIP refers to preferences rather 
than abilities but nevertheless it seems apt to 
account for a substantial part of variance present 
in general mental ability, as measured by standard 
intelligence tests. In other words, organization 
of information processing should add some 
unique amount of explained variance of general 
intelligence, thus supplementing the already 
recognized factors of attentional resources and 
working memory capacity. In order to check 
if this line of reasoning makes sense we need 
alternative methods for operationalization of the 
OPI construct, which should take place in further 
research. We also need to check if OIP adds to the 
percentage of explained variance when Gf, rather 
than analogical reasoning accuracy, is used as a 
dependent variable. But taking into account the 
fact that analogical reasoning is closely related to 
fl uid intelligence (Holyoak, 2005), the proposed 
line of explanation seems tenable.
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